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Abstract This chapter discusses local self-government in Belgium. After 
situating the two tier local government system in the historical development 
of the state, it subsequently addresses the legal foundation and the scope of 
local self-government. Then, the protection of local authority boundaries, 
the administrative structures and resources for their tasks, the conditions 
under which responsibilities at the local level are exercised and the 
administrative supervision of their activities enter the fray. The chapter 
continues with outlining the  financial resources and transfer system and 
the right to associate for local authorities. It concludes by delineating the 
future challenges for the implementation of the European Charter of Local 
Self-Government in Belgium.   
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1 Introduction and history  
 
Belgium is often situated within the Southern, Franco or Napoleonic state tradition of 
intergovernmental relations. It has a two tier local government system comprised of 
provinces (N = 10) and municipalities (N = 581). For this chapter we will focus on the 
municipal tier.  
 
With regard to the status of Belgian local self-government, a distinction should be made 
between the era before and after 2002. From that year onwards and as a result of the 
ongoing federalization process of the country, the constitutive framework on local self-
government became a competence of the regions. This means that the Flemish Region, 
the Walloon Region and the Brussels-Capital Region (to a lesser extent given its specific 
constitutional status) can set and alter the basic laws regulating the political and 
administrative organization of their municipalities (respectively N = 300, 262 and 19). 
Since then, the composition, organization, competences and functioning of local entities 
can differ between regions and subsequent legal frameworks have been established1. The 
first two regions have indeed embarked upon (continuing debates on) local government 
reform of which some translate into differences in terms of local self-government. 
Brussels has largely kept the former Belgian framework for its local government. Since 
then, ‘central’ government means in fact the combination of its regional and federal 
component. 
 
Three qualifications are needed however. First, the former Belgian Local Government 
Act (established in 1836, updated and consolidated in 1988) has served as a starting and 
reversion point for all regions implying that many similarities remain between them. 
Second, even before the regionalization of the constitutive framework steps had been 
taken to devolve aspects of local government regulation to Flanders, Wallonia and 
Brussels such as the functions concerning the supervision of local government (1980), 
the municipal fund (1988) and intermunicipal cooperation (1993). This implies that even 
before 2002, the regions had the possibility to reform these aspects. Third, some aspects 
of local government regulation have remained in the orbit of the federal government (such 
as the framework on local police, firefighting or the public social welfare center).  
 
Given this (qualified) regionalization and the critical juncture it implies, we will compile 
this country report by starting from the conjoint Belgian patterns, making relevant 
differences between regions and/or throughout time explicit in discussing each dimension 
of the chapter. 
 
The discussion of the different dimensions of the European Charter of Local Self-
Government and associated interpretations are mainly based on the legal framework, a 
 
1 The legal frameworks hence referred to are: Nieuwe Gemeentewet (Belgium, 1988-2002); Gemeentedecreet 
(Flemish Region, since 2006) and Gemeentekiesdecreet (Flemish Region, since 2006), Code de la Démocratie 
Locale et de la Décentralisation (Walloon Region, since 2006). In Brussels (since 2003) some ordinances have 
modified aspects of the pre-2002 framework without replacing it with a consolidated regional counterpart. 
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secondary analysis of existing data and/or the literature (see references). For the 
dimension 'financial resources of local authorities and financial transfer system' 
additional primary data were put at our disposal by Belfius bank2. 
 
2 Constitution and legal foundation for local self-government 
 
In Belgium, the right to local self-government is explicitly included in and protected by 
the constitution (art. 41 and 162). Belgian local government has an open set of tasks (i.e. 
place-bound residual competencies). Municipal councils have the general competence to 
autonomously determine issues of local interest. This provision should be read as a 
negative one however, implying that it upholds as long as no other level of government 
has assumed legal responsibility for the area under question (mainly through sectorial 
legislation, regulation or other authoritative policy-instruments). Also, even with regard 
to local self-government central (i.e. regional or federal) supervision applies. In practice, 
the scope of local tasks is thus co-determined by central government3.  
 
The regions cannot alter this institutional safeguard (but have indeed impacted upon the 
actual substance of autonomy) and it has thus remained a constant throughout time (De 
Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010; De Becker, 2013). 
 
3 Scope of local self-government  
 
Regarding the scope of local self-government in, our evaluation should be seen in view 
of the previous dimension and against the backdrop of multilevel governance and the 
subsequent policy entanglement that characterizes Belgium. There is an evident 
(dynamic) equilibrium at the local level between self-government (full autonomy), co-
governance (partial autonomy) and deconcentrated central government (no autonomy in 
merely executing assigned administrative tasks)4.  
 
As a result of their general competence, municipalities have probed into many issues, 
fields and domains of public policy with a local character and interest. However, central 
government has equally deployed activities that often have a place-bound component 
(and where municipalities will subsequently exercise tasks that have been assigned to 
them by law) or aim to coordinate or standardize formerly local choices. In practice, this 
means that they co-determine the sphere of local action and municipalities often act as 
agents of the center with differing degrees of discretion. It also implies that with regard 
 
2 We are very grateful to Mrs. Anne-Leen Erauw (Senior Analyst Public Finance Research Belfius) in this 
respect. 
3 Legal debate exists about whether there is a core of local autonomy central government cannot impinge upon. 
The making of the local budget (including the right for local taxation), the appointment of local officials, the 
management of local properties and partaking in legal proceedings are often considered as key-elements. 
However, it its often argued that the precise delineation of local autonomy is ‘one of the mysteries of Belgian 
public law’ and no enumeration of local competencies exists up to today (De Becker, 2013). 
4 The latter would include e.g. responsibility for public law and order, the management of civil administrative 
functions and the maintenance of population registers.  
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to most issues, municipalities usually have some but seldom all of the responsibilities 
(Plees, 2006; De Ceuninck, Steyvers, Valcke & Van Bever, 2010).  
 
Therefore, our evaluation of the various functions mentioned represents a picture of 
partial responsibility by default. This overall assessment needs to be qualified according 
to the different policy domains under consideration (Wayenberg, De Rynck, Steyvers & 
Pilet, 2011). With regard to (primary) education, for instance, local government is indeed 
fully responsible for the construction/maintenance of school buildings and the 
employment/payment of teachers from the municipal sector. In addition, linguistic 
communities (one of the regional levels in Belgium) and third sector organizations (such 
as the Catholic Church) are also very active in primary education separate from the 
municipal sector. Hence, responsibility is shared between the so-called official 
(established by the public sector) and free (established by the non-profit sector) 
education5.  
 
Belgian municipalities assume functions with regard to economic (and other) help to 
destitute people. This is mainly concerned with the provision of means-tested poverty 
relief support and associated services where the municipal sector takes the bulk of 
responsibility. The way in which this is organized represents a specificity for Belgium. 
For each municipality in the country there namely is a so-called Public Center for Social 
Wellbeing (PCSW). This is a separately appointed public body with a legal entity 
responsible for providing constituents in need with assistance in services or support and 
managing specific caring establishments6. The regionalization of local government has 
affected this organizational form however as Flemish government imposed the integration 
of the PCSW into the municipality from 2019 onwards. As a result, municipalities became 
largely responsible for social policy. Municipalities have less responsibility with regard 
to social security/protection (e.g. none with regard to financial transfers such as pensions 
or child benefits) which is predominantly organized at the regional and/or the federal level 
(e.g. deconcentrated through field offices). They are however active in local social policy 
predominantly rendering them an enabling authority to gather relevant stakeholders and 
to try to develop shared objectives and frames of reference.  
 
Municipal responsibilities for primary health services follow the sectorial logic of 
primary education and organizational logic of social assistance. Historically, many 
municipalities through their PCSWs disposed of their own clinics and/or health center 
with an associated staff. The municipal health sector was complemented (and often 
organizationally predominated) by similar initiatives from third sector organization 
 
5 In many municipalities both primary education from the official as well as the free net are present. For 
historical reasons, Belgium highly values parents’ free choice of schools in philosophical terms. Evidently, also 
the free net is highly regulated and subsidized by the state with an eye on education policy standards.  
6 The PCSW has a council and an executive. It is not directly elected but installed after the first meeting of the 
municipal council. Its structure and functioning are highly similar to the multipurpose municipal government 
with a specific-purpose focus on designated aspects of social policy (including poverty relief). In Flanders and 
since the 2019 reform, the council of the PCSW and that of the municipality coincide. 
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(especially the Catholic Church) equally establishing facilities and employing doctors7. 
Due to scale-enlargement in the health sector (partly market-driven, partly government-
imposed) municipalities lost ground in the health sector. If nowadays they are still running 
health facilities, these are mainly of the policlinic or day-clinic type whereas more 
specialized services are rendered in urban localities only (providing for the wider regional 
area in a more or less hierarchical regulatory arrangement).  
 
For land use municipalities (and particularly the executive branch) are indeed largely 
responsible for administering building permits and zoning. It should be mentioned 
however that this domain is heavily regulated and supervised by central (i.e. regional) 
government8. Contrary to land use, municipalities do not take responsibility for the 
provision of public transport services.  
 
Local government is only partly responsible for housing and town development. 
Particularly with regard to housing, the municipal sector in the stricter sense only plays a 
supplementary role next to social housing corporations of which some are inter-municipal 
however. Overall, the share of public housing is relatively limited in comparison to that 
held in private hands. Municipalities (particularly the mayor) have a few responsibilities 
in terms of public order related to housing (assessing livability, taxing vacancy, etc.). 
With the exception of the larger cities (in which urban development is a more substantial 
portfolio), municipal activities in terms of development mainly coincide with zoning on 
the one hand and public infrastructure on the other hand.  
 
Local government is partly responsible for traffic and public order policing. A reform in 
1998 integrated the formerly separated municipal police with the local brigades of the 
national gendarmerie. This so-called unified local police works under a centrally defined 
uniform framework and is complementary to its federal counterpart. Some argue this is a 
relative loss of local responsibility and discretion enhanced by the scale-enlargement in 
police zones (mostly comprised of more than one municipality) that followed suit (De 
 
7 Municipalities are neither directly responsible for doctors’ payment even if they work in a PCSW-clinic nor 
for additional medical costs. Doctors are organized in corporate associations agreeing on honorary fees for 
specific medical actions. Clinics/health centers will also have publicly regulated scales for particular additional 
medical services/provisions. The total of all medical costs is largely covered by an obliged public insurance 
against illness. Health insurance funds with a semi-public status administer policy in individual cases (e.g. it is 
obliged to be a member of one of these and they will pay back most of the remaining medical costs the patient 
still has to cover after the largest part already being assumed by the social security mechanism).  
8 For example: municipalities have full responsibility for issuing permits only if they have a so-called 
emancipated status. This is rendered to them if they meet a number of requirements (such as disposing of an 
approved municipal spatial structure plan, a municipal functionary in charge of the built environment and 
acknowledged spatial registries). Nowadays, almost all municipalities do indeed have such a status. For their 
non-emancipated counterparts, the advice of a regional functionary for the built environment is necessary. In 
addition: the municipal spatial executive plan (as the binding framework for administering decisions on zoning) 
always is the specification of the regional spatial (executive) plan.   
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Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010)9. However, local government is still responsible for place-
bound security including administrative and judicial policing tasks.  
 
Finally, with regard to caring (kindergartens and services for the elderly or disabled) the 
logic of primary education and health applies. Within the municipal sector, local 
government has an extensive responsibility. However, third and sometimes also private 
sector actors (albeit highly regulated and/or extensively subsidized) offer similar services 
and provisions and compete with those in the hands of local government.  
 
Overall, there are no important changes in function discernible due to regionalization that 
significantly affect this picture. Evidently, evolution over time can be determined with 
regard to specific (packages of) tasks. The most common pattern is one in which local 
government has gained in terms of the number of tasks in various domains accompanied 
by framework legislation (and an associated combination of financial incentives and 
specific supervision) from the federal or the regional level. Especially the latter has taken 
an activist stance (with more intervention through regulation, finances or objectives) 
increasing the interwoven character of most policy domains. In addition, regions do differ 
with regard to the per capita spending in important areas reflecting varying priorities in 
policy as expressed by expenditure10 (De Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010). 
 
Given the wide nature of the policy domains discussed above, these tendencies are more 
a matter of degree11. The standard setting thus remains one in which local government is 
at least partially involved in and responsible for the tasks mentioned usually in 
conjunction with its regional and/or federal counterpart.  
Finally, the consultation of local authorities in the planning and decision-making 
processes at central level should explicitly be seen against the corporate conception of 
this element of local self-government in the Charter, i.e. the extent to which local 
government as an organized and associated interest has indirect access to and influence 
over its central counterpart. It should be assessed against a culture of political localism 
and in particular the common practice of dual mandate-holding as a specific means for 
particular local interest mediation (De Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010).  
 
 
9 About 75% of all zones are comprised of more than one municipality. These zones have their own police 
council and executive where delegates from the constituent municipal entities determine policy. In zones 
comprised of one municipality the council and the mayor are maintaining sole responsibility.  
10 In the Brussels-Capital Region, the regional level has assumed a number of functions related to land-use (e.g. 
environmental policy or urban planning). However, the municipalities in the region do still have some partial 
responsibility for this function. For a number of person-related competences, the applicable framework within 
Brussels differs (since these domains are within the realm of the linguistic-cultural communities). More general, 
differences between regions are more pronounced if we would consider alternative indicators such as public 
employment or the per capita spending on various policy domains. In Wallonia and Brussels the local sector is 
more public than in Flanders.  
11 One could argue that the list of tasks for which local government is ‘partly responsible’ has increased in most 
policy domains as has the part of the responsibility this refers to.  
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE 




Traditionally, there were neither legal provisions nor standard procedures for structural 
negations between the local and central levels of government. Central government was 
not obliged to consult local government in preparing, making or implementing its policy. 
There was no formal mechanism of representation. Evidently, this did not preclude an 
extensive degree of actual interaction and the possibility for local government 
(associations) to influence central policy. This was largely dependent however on the 
openness of the center (and its willingness to adapt to local demands and interests) and/or 
the strategic capacity of local government (and its associations).  
 
Particularly with regard to the latter, some changes can be discerned propelled by the 
process of regionalization and affecting Flanders in particular. The Association of 
Flemish Cities and Communes (as the regional offspring of a former Belgian counterpart) 
has become a more important player in intergovernmental relations. The organization has 
professionalized and its extensive staff now covers almost all policy domains whilst 
developing policy networks with relevant central actors (such as ministers, cabinets, 
administrative departments, parliamentary committees or parties). Next to rendering 
services and giving technical advice to its members, the association engages in proactive 
policy-making and lobbying towards central government. The association is (informally) 
acknowledged (particularly by regional government) as the corporate umbrella of local 
government (although internal differences exist according to municipal size or partisan 
affiliation) and more routinely involved in issues of central policy or decision-making 
that may affect the position of local government (a consultation phase with the appropriate 
corporate interests has become more accustomed). This does not imply any legal 
obligation for consultation or representation (left alone central government always 
follows the views of the organization)12. Therefore, it could reasonably be argued that in 
Flanders the reach of influence from local government over national policy-making has 
extended to something more substantial. This holds in particular for the more technical 
or applied aspects of regulation and policy (to a lesser extent for the main principles where 
the center is less inclined to give in)13. This professionalization is less outspoken in 
Wallonia and Brussels and the respective associations have a more limited supportive 
role.  
 
The type of corporate access the above refers to, should be seen against the backdrop of 
a strong and persistent culture of political localism referring to specific local interests and 
the political influence of particular local governments playing a substantial role in central 
government decisions. This is enhanced by the local anchorage of politicians at the central 
level. Decisions over the distribution of goods and services are often based on territorial 
 
12 Since 2007 Flanders has established the Flemish Advisory Council for Administrative Affairs. This is an 
independent advisory board of the regional government and parliament. Its role is to give advice on draft decrees 
in designated policy areas (where the Region is obliged to ask for this advice) or to do so on its own initiative. 
The council is dominated by expert members, but the local government association can also send its 
representatives. This could be considered as a soft version of formal representation and consultation of local 
government at the regional level. The previous government has abolished the council however.   
13 It is perhaps a bit too bold to discern such a general increase as the amount of influence will differ according 
to the issue at stake.  
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affiliations of central and party political relations of local politicians. The latter have 
direct access to the center. The most common and sustained mechanism by which this is 
achieved is the holding of dual mandates. The bulk of all members of parliament (either 
regional or federal) conjointly occupy a mandate at the local level (either as a councillor, 
alderman or mayor). Alternatively, local mandate-holders will use their partisan network 
to connect with Brussels. This direct access is seen (and defended) as a means to influence 
central decision-making in favor of specific local interests. It gives local politicians 
leverage to intervene for their local government14. Regionalization has left the prevalence 
of this practice largely untouched. In Flanders, its potential effect is said to have 
diminished however (in conjunction with the relative increase of block grants and more 
contractual planning relationships and a neutral management style for routine programs) 
and more focused on regional grants for important local infrastructure and investment or 
the direct variant of the latter by the center in the local area. With regard to Wallonia and 
Brussels, political localism is seen as remaining predominant even in daily politics and 
regarding operational programs15. 
 
4 Protection of local authority boundaries  
 
Regarding the changes in local authority boundaries, Belgium shows a mixed picture. 
Back in the 1960s and 1970s forced municipal amalgamations reduced the number of 
Belgian local authorities drastically (De Ceuninck, 2009). This started in 1964, when the 
country still counted 2.663 local authorities. By 1972 that number was reduced to 2.359. 
The most drastic reform would however take place in 1976, when the total number of 
local authorities was further reduced to 589 by way of large scale compulsory 
amalgamations. This reform found its legal base in a 1971 parliamentary act that created 
the possibility to amalgamate all Belgian municipalities by way of a parliamentary vote. 
It was without doubt the most drastic reform that ever occurred at the local level. This 
reform was motivated by different elements. One was to make the local authorities 
financially healthy again. Also, the changing social environment of municipalities (e.g. 
increased mobility) was a reason for a larger scale on the local level, next to the need to 
create a better cooperation between central cities and neighboring suburban 
municipalities (to avoid the disadvantages of spillover effects). A final motive for this 
enlargement of the local scale was to increase the governing capacity of the local 
authorities. Also, they were promised extra competences after the reform, a promise that 
was never granted. 
 
Although there were several good reasons for that reform, it will be remembered primarily 
by the way it was implemented. The reform was initiated by central government and left 
little or no room for a local contribution. The government wanted the reform to be 
 
14 Some argue that this practice also and ultimately enhances loyalty to the center (i.e. parties and executives) 
to the extent that it will prevail over local interests in general.  
15 It should be mentioned that the Walloon Parliament has recently formally limited dual mandate-holding. Only 
the fourth of members of parliament with most preference votes (on the regional candidate list they were elected 
on) of each party group can continue to conjointly hold an elected mandate at the local level.   
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implemented very quickly, in the belief that otherwise there would be hardly any mergers. 
A request to link referendums to those mergers was rejected by the government, who 
formulated a merger proposal for each municipality. The local authorities could only issue 
an advice on that proposal. Those advices were particularly contradictory, giving the 
government free rein to decide who would merge with whom. Only a direct access to the 
minister could ensure that certain mergers plans were subsequently amended. In this way 
a number of municipalities (N = 92) succeeded in not having to merge at all. 
 
This top-down decision making resulted in a long lasting taboo on scale reforms in 
Belgium. Many local politicians felt themselves victim of higher party interests. It thus 
came as a surprise that the Flemish government, that took office in 2009, announced that 
it would stimulate voluntary mergers. This was part of an ‘internal state reform’ by which 
the Flemish government wanted to simplify the administrative landscape (Vlaamse 
Regering, 2011). The main goals were to empower the local government level and to 
reduce the provincial level as the current second tier of local government. The Flemish 
government saw a coordinating and guiding role for themselves as central government. 
In order to strengthen the local government level, voluntary amalgamations were 
stimulated by a combination of a financial bonus to the amalgamating municipalities and 
assured administrative support in the complex process of a merger. Flanders then counts 
308 municipalities, of which about 79 do not have 10.000 inhabitants (VVSG, 2016). 
Encouraging voluntary mergers was seen as a way to strengthen the local level in order 
to transfer additional powers to it. It would also help the local authorities to better deal 
with future challenges. Despite the interest of some, not a single municipality took the 
step towards a voluntary amalgamation. There are several reasons for this. The measures 
came way too late in the local legislature, which meant that they were close to the local 
elections in 2012. In addition, many local decision-makers were unaware of the 
advantages of municipal mergers. That, combined with the limited political support, made 
the measure unpopular (De Ceuninck, Steyvers & Valcke, 2016). 
 
The Flemish government that took office in 2014 showed continuity in the approach 
towards the local level compared with the previous legislative term (De Ceuninck, Valcke 
& Verhelst, 2018). The stimulation of voluntary amalgamations of municipalities was 
again a policy priority for the Flemish government. The measures developed in the 
previous legislative term were more elaborated in the form of a Flemish decree on 
voluntary amalgamations in 2016. The Flemish government created extra financial and 
political support for voluntary amalgamations, by means of a debt assumption by the 
Flemish government of EUR 500 per inhabitant and the possibility to appoint more deputy 
mayors in the two legislative periods after a merger. Finally, 15 Flemish municipalities 
decided to merge by January 1, 2019 into 7 new municipalities. The 15 municipalities 
involved invested a great deal in involving the population in these merger plans. In only 
one municipality a popular consultation was organized, but too few people showed up so 
that the results were not even counted. 
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Until now, the scale debate or the demand for municipal mergers, was not so fiercely and 
concretely on the political agenda in Wallonia or the Brussels region16.  
 
5 Administrative structures and resources for the tasks of local 
authorities  
 
The 1990s were a decade of hesitant administrative modernization for local government 
in Belgium of which some translated into more autonomy in terms of staff (e.g. more 
timely instruments and processes of human resources) and local structures (e.g. 
establishment of arms-length agencies, systems of budgeting and accounting). Especially 
since 1995 (when most of these modernizations were introduced), the autonomy in terms 
of staff and structure has increased substantially (e.g. in terms or hiring staff, fixing their 
salary – although this only applies for non-statutory employees, choosing the 
organizational structure, establishing legal entities and municipal enterprises) (Plees, 
2006).  
 
These ideas and tendencies have continued after regionalization (De Rynck & 
Wayenberg, 2010; Wayenberg, De Rynck, Steyvers & Pilet, 2011). The Flemish region 
has been most enthusiast about adopting organizational modernization practices diffused 
under the banner of New Public Management. This has been apparent in a number of 
measures: introducing strategic planning in municipal policy-making (and integrating it 
with the functional management domains as to link multiannual goals with financial and 
personnel commitments in the policy and management cycle), giving leading 
administrators more managerial leeway and stimulating them to cooperate by establishing 
a management team, providing different forms of agency to place parts of policy at arms-
length of the municipality or more contractual employment (as opposed to statutory 
personnel with tenure and fixed working conditions). In Wallonia and Brussels change is 
limited to non-existent as compared to the former (modernized) Belgian framework. The 
primacy of politics and more hierarchical relations with administrators tend to prevail. 
Given the possibilities already allowed by the modernized Belgian framework (and at 
least the continuation thereafter) we designate a score of 2 for autonomy in staff and 
structure for the period since 200217.   
 
 
16 From time to time, there is a debate about the political fragmentation of the 19 Brussels municipalities 
however in relation to city-regional and/or metropolitan challenges allegedly unsufficiently solved at the level 
of the Brussels Capital Region. This is compounded by the complex decision-making situation in the Brussels 
policy area where different and sometimes overlapping or intersecting institutions coexist.  
17 As with most aspects of self-government, this should be read as the possibility to make a number of place-
bound choices within clear limits of legal and regulatory central frameworks often accompanied by forms of 
supervision. E.g. in Flanders municipalities can choose to establish agencies but the procedure to do so is 
outlined in detail in the municipal decree, including an impetus to opt for forms that are close to the municipality 
first and only later and accompanied by an extensive motivation for more at-length variants.  
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6 Conditions under which responsibilities at local level are exercised 
 
Belgium traditionally organized its local elections via a (semi-)open list system of 
proportional representation (Imperiali-method). The same system applied for all localities 
and was anchored in (municipal) electoral law. Only the members of the local council 
were directly elected (as enshrined in the constitution). Given its predominantly monist 
and parliamentary conception of legislative-executive relations a council of mayor and 
aldermen (CMA) was then subsequently elected among these councillors to act as a 
collegiate and collective executive of the municipality18. Formally, the nomination of this 
CMA had to be supported by a majority in the council (a form of investiture). Informally, 
this was the result of a process of majority formation often in the form of governing 
coalitions of political parties. The composition of the CMA (i.e. the number of mandates 
for or the distribution of specific portfolios to each party and selected individual mandate-
holders) was often regarded as the capstone of this process.  
 
Mayors have always occupied a specific position in this cycle. Historically, the mandate 
included a strong supra-local component and part of the associated task was to act as a 
representative of the center at the local level. As a consequence, and despite of the 
requirement to be elected as a councillor, the mayor was appointed by central government 
after nomination by the council (as part of that of the CMA). Gradually, the mandate of 
mayor has become more localized both in terms of selection as well as of functioning. 
With regard to the first, the attribution of the mayoral position is part of the governing 
formation process and an informal practice has emerged to nominate as mayor the 
candidate with most preference votes of the largest party in the coalition. The formal 
appointment survived however, in the bulk of all cases as the central rubber-stamp of a 
local choice. With regard to the latter, local tasks have become priority over central 
counterparts and mayors could definitely be seen as the first citizens of their municipality 
(assuming many local leadership roles). Given that the scores refer to the whole of the 
executive and the factual indirect election of the mayor it is felt safe to assess that the 
executive is elected by the municipal council.  
 
Overall, the Belgian system described above has remained largely intact in the 
regionalized context after 2002 when in principle variegated organizational systems could 
be created (De Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010). Both the electoral system as well as the way 
in which the executive attains office remained constant and uniform for all municipalities, 
despite fierce debates on reform. In the Flemish Region, e.g. the latter concentrated on 
the direct election of the mayor or making the electoral system more proportional without 
effective consequences. In Flanders, preference votes have received relative more weight 
in determining who gets elected. And the council can elect its own president (instead of 
the default option of the mayor). Furthermore, the number of aldermen will be reduced 
with 1 in the next legislature. In the Walloon region, the existing informal mode of 
 
18 The municipal council has the residual fullness of competence with the exception of a limited number of 
explicitly enumerated counterparts for the CMA. In the Flemish Region, the latter can be supplemented by 
powers delegated from the council to the executive (allowing for a more tailor-made municipal organization).  
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mayoral designation was formalized whilst at the same time adopting the possibility of a 
motion of censure against the executive (i.e. individually or collectively) in an attempt to 
strengthen the parliamentary nature of the system. Also, the Flemish region adopted a 
(limited and collective) constructive vote of no confidence as a means to empower the 
council vis-à-vis the executive board. A few minor modifications have thus occurred in 
some regions but not to subvert the path dependencies of the previous Belgian era. 
 
In terms of the politicians' statute, the Belgian system is characterized by a sharp divide 
between local politicians holding an executive office (i.e. a position in the CMA) and 
non-executive councillors (Wayenberg et al., 2011). The social statute and reward of the 
mayors and aldermen was improved by Belgian government in 1999 and reconfirmed by 
the regions afterwards. This system includes, amongst others, earnings, holiday pay, 
expenses and a retirement fee. Non-executive councillors on the other hand still 
predominantly act as layman politicians who receive an attendance fee for council or 
committee meetings (and, potentially, some political leave, temporaly replacement or – 
minimal – expenses, e.g. for training seminars, literature, transport)19.  
 
The legal statute furthermore guarantees assistance for disabled councillors, municipal 
responsability and assurance to cover civil liability of local politicians in office and 
defines the incompatabilities with local elective office in Belgium (e.g. magistrates, 
provincial governors, second-degree relatives, administrative personnel of the 
municipality). It also lists the instruments councillors dispose of to fullfil their mandate 
(e.g. interpellations, field visists to municipal institutions, copy right, consultation of 
policy documents, agenda-setting in and convening of the council, information from the 
muncipal administration, etc.). No sharp regional divides are to be found in this respect20. 
 
7 Administrative supervision of local authorities' activities 
 
The interpretation of the administrative supervision of local authorities' activities follows 
from the continuation of one typical feature of the Franco-model, i.e. the existence of 
extensive administrative supervision. Even when the extreme versions of the latter have 
been modified the tenet of central oversight and control over the local level has persisted 
over time and in the various regions (De Ceuninck, Steyvers, Valcke & Van Bever, 2010; 
De Becker, 2013).  
 
Before the 1980s supervision was the exclusive privilege of national government. As a 
result of the state reform the regions gradually assumed that competence (even before a 
full federal system was in place). Throughout that period and until today, the provincial 
governor played a crucial role in supervision, acting as the place-bound representative of 
 
19 These fees are defined by the municipal council within limits set by central government.  
20 The Flemish local government act however includes the possibility to financially support the political groups 
in the council.  
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the center21. The accustomed conception of supervision was twofold. Decisions of local 
government either needed preliminary approval by central government before they could 
be enacted (principle of visa) or these could be suspended and ultimately nullified should 
the center find them in contradiction with the law (principle of legality) or the general 
interest (principle of expedience). Supervision of legality and expedience have been 
enshrined in the country’s constitution (art. 162). Expedience (the general interest) has 
long been interpreted in practice as giving the center the possibility to act both when local 
decisions ran counter central objectives as well as when they were perceived to fail the 
interests of the local community.  
 
The constitutional foundation for supervision has remained unchanged, also after the 
regionalization of 2002. In the Walloon and Brussels-Capital regions, the traditional 
principles of supervision and their subsequent interpretation have largely sustained. Little 
structural change has occurred in this regard or is likely to emerge in the near future. Both 
preliminary approval as well as the possibility of suspension or nullification continue to 
be accepted routines in central-local relations and are often interpreted in a maximalist 
way. In Flanders, whilst upholding the (constitutional) principles, the interpretation has 
become less strict leading to an actual deregulation of supervision22. For one thing, the 
range of local decisions encompassed by preliminary approval has been greatly reduced. 
For another, in contemporary Flemish practice suspension and nullification will only be 
deployed after a formal complaint of an actor who sees his interests harmed by a particular 
local decision. In addition, the general interest is now interpreted as one that should 
transcend local government implying the principle of expedience can only apply when 
larger interests are potentially threatened (and not just that of the local community)23. 
 
8 Financial resources of local authorities and financial transfer system 
 
The outlook of the financial structure of Belgian local self-government reflects the 
contingent nature of local fiscal autonomy. Local government can indeed independently 
tax its population. This is a constitutional prerogative of the municipal council (art. 170) 
in line with the idea of general competence (see ‘constitution and legal foundation for 
 
21 The regions first gained the responsibility for the actual daily supervision of their localities (1980) before 
acquiring the ability to effectively change its constitutive framework (1988). The governor now acts as a 
representative of the regional or the federal government (depending on which central level is constitutive for a 
particular decision). 
22 This has been anchored in the municipal decree (i.e. the regional local government act) in use since 2006 (art. 
249). 
23 It should be noted that this modernization largely concerns the so-called general supervision (with the regional 
agency competent for internal affairs in a coordinating role). Supervision over specific policy domains (resulting 
from the increasing entanglement between regional and local domains) follows more traditional principles and 
interpretations (often including detailed preliminary regulations and intermediate reporting obligations for local 
government). Moreover, is has long been uncoordinated. Flanders has recently adopted a decree aimed at 
reducing the planning burden for local government partly trying to impinge upon and reduce this specific 
supervision. 
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local self-government’)24. Depending on the type of tax local government can determine 
the base and the rate (for minor taxes) or only the latter (for major taxes). Often, central 
government imposes restrictions on local taxation. Nowadays taxes make up about half 
of all municipal income (Bafoil & Lefèvre, 2008; Dessoy, Erauw & Lafontaine, 2014)25. 
From a comparative perspective, this level of fiscal discretion is relatively extensive. 
However, a closer and more specific look nuances.  
 
The bulk of the local tax income (80% of all taxes or 40% of the total local income) 
namely comes from two major taxes that are in fact supplemental, i.e. grafted on a base 
and standardized rate set by another governmental level. Here, local government only has 
leeway to set the rates of the supplements26.  
 
The first is a form of income tax. More in particular it is a percentage local government 
can add to the general ex-ante taxation (corrected ex-post) of personal income gained 
from labor with standardized rates and bases set by the federal government (that is also 
responsible for its collection) for citizens who have their main abode on the territory of 
the municipality. Whilst municipalities are free to set their own supplemental value and 
sometimes use central bases and alleged associated pressures to shed unpopular elements 
of local choice, it also makes them dependent on the tax policy of their federal 
counterpart. If the latter decides e.g. to lower the standardized rates or alter the base, 
municipalities are obliged to increase their percentage supplemental income tax (SINT) 
if they are willing to derive the same level of income. In addition, this income tax is 
progressive as its standardized rates (disproportionately but within a fork) increase with 
the level of taxable income declared. This implies that the supplemented income derived 
from this tax is sensitive to the decisions in terms of demographic mobility of (a small 
group of well-waged) people.  
 
The second is a form of property tax. In particular, it is a part (called opcentiemen) local 
government can add to the ex-ante taxation of immovable goods (i.e. houses and 
apartments) owned by citizens who have their main abode on the territory of the 
municipality. This is a mixed competence involving three levels of government. Whereas 
the standardized rate for this tax is set by the regional government (hence also collected 
by it) its base is categorized (so not progressive) upon a standardized measure of property 
value (kadastraal inkomen) determined by the federal government. Similar problems of 
local dependency thus occur with regards to this supplemental immovable tax (SIMT). 
 
 
24 The federal government can determine the range of local fiscal autonomy however, by prohibiting certain 
taxes to be levied.  
25 Between 2000 and 2012 local government taxes conjointly represented a bit more than 4 to a bit more than 
5% of all government taxation income. With the latter representing about 45% of GDP, this implies that local 
government taxation consumed around 2,3% of GDP.  
26 These resources are considered as own-source tax revenue since they are surtaxes and not a fraction of tax 
receipts of supra-local levels (which would designate them as shared tax revenues).  
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The remainder of non-supplemental minor local taxes (20% of all taxes or 10% of the 
total local income) are more genuinely place-bound. Recent accounts for the Flemish 
region show that no less than 90 different varieties of such taxes could be discerned with 
a ditto divergence in terms of bases and rates (e.g. on public sanity, economic activity, 
equity or occupying the public domain). Recently, the three regions have embarked on an 
attempt to reduce the multiplication of local taxes as a means to induce place-bound 
economic growth. Although the particularities differ according to the regional 
arrangement, the main mechanism is similar: the financial losses invoked by the centrally 
stimulated abundance of certain local taxes and/or limiting and structuring other ones are 
compensated by regional government. It is clear that the price of this fiscal peace is a 
relative reduction of municipal autonomy.  
 
With regard to the overall extent of independent local taxation power however, the 
traditional Belgian fiscal regime described above has clearly sustained after 
regionalization (De Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010). 
 
Next to their own sources, transfers from central government are an important part of the 
revenue of local government. These transfers are either conditional or unconditional 
reflecting varying degrees of financial autonomy.  
 
The way in which these transfers have been organized varies over time and/or between 
regions in Belgium, ranging from the dominance of conditional transfers to the 
dominance of unconditional grants. This variation is more due to incremental changes 
over time and/or gradual differences between areas than the result of a deliberative shift 
or substantial territorially variegated choice in central policy on financial transfers 
although some trends can be discerned. In the era where Belgium as a national (unitary 
and later on federal) state was responsible for local government, the financial transfer 
system comprised both conditional and unconditional transfers to an equal degree, 
although the share of unconditional financial grants was to be situated at the upper limit 
of the fork determined in the index (approximating 60% or surmounting it, as was the 
case in two years of the pre-2002 era). Since the regionalization in 2002, either a balance 
between both types of grants (Flanders) or a dominance of unconditional grants 
(Wallonia) can be discerned. However, again the variation between both regions is more 
a matter of degree (just below and above 60%) corresponding with (qualitatively) 
different categories in the index. Only in Brussels, conditional grants are clearly dominant 
(consistently above 60%).  
 
Unconditional local (or block) granting by central government has been a feature of 
intergovernmental relations since the 19th century under the form of a so-called communal 
or municipal fund. This fund has come under the guidance of respective regional 
governments since 1988. Since then, each region had its own fund. All have kept the 
combination of two main goals: guaranteeing a stable growth path (according to the 
number and importance of the tasks required by central government) as well as providing 
financial equity (by redistributing resources to ensure solidarity). The sum received by 
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each municipality is not earmarked (i.e. reserving it for specific functions and/or requiring 
a particular approach, method or instrumentation) to maximize expenditure discretion.  
 
Until 2002, the various regional regulations remained quite similar. They were 
predominantly based on categories of local government according to the number of 
inhabitants. For larger cities, a specific proportion of the fund was guaranteed while the 
distribution to their smaller municipal counterparts was mainly based on the principle of 
equity. In Flanders, a 2002 decree established a fixed growth path and integrated some 
earmarked funds into the general fund. Also, the criteria of fiscal equity and compensation 
for the alleged costs of functional spillover (mainly from central cities to their suburban 
environment) gained prominence. Lastly, a new fund for larger cities was created with 
open-ended goals to meet local priorities in contractual agreements with central 
government27. It is felt that in Flanders, these changes have increased local discretion. At 
the same time and as mentioned, Flanders is the region that has displayed most regulatory 
activism often implying an executive role for local government in fulfilling centrally 
defined tasks in exchange for earmarked granting (De Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010). In 
Wallonia, a reform was adopted in 2008 including the determination of new criteria for 
the overall growth of the municipal fund and for its distribution. The implementation of 
the latter was spread in time with a transition period of more than 20 years (Dessoy, Erauw 
& Lafontaine, 2014). 
 
Local sources have traditionally been an important part of municipal income. Around 
80% of such sources are taxes (the bulk of which are two surtaxes on a regional and 
federal base complemented by strictly local counterparts) and retributions. The remainder 
is divided between fee revenues generated by user contributions to the costs of specific 
local services and provisions of the local authority and debt revenues as the recurrent 
financial receipts collected by municipalities. The latter is a mix of dividend payouts from 
energy inter-municipal companies (which was traditionally the most important but has 
lost prominence under the European liberalization of the market), municipal holding 
companies, interest or revenue generated by monetary investments and reimbursements 
from their parties of the borrowing costs linked to loans initially contracted by the 
municipalities (Bafoil & Lefèvre, 2008).  
 
Whereas own sources yielded over 50% of the municipal income for the pre-2002 era, in 
the Walloon Region these have been a bit below 50% throughout. Particularly during the 
last decade, the proportional share of own sources in local revenues has increased 
everywhere however (up to a bit more than 50% in Brussels and 60% in Flanders and 




27 The current Flemish government wishes to integrate this into the municipal fund however. In addition, there 
is an ongoing discussion on the criteria used for the distribution of this fund and the consequences for specific 
categories of municipalities (and those bordering between categories).  
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Borrowing is regarded a legitimate source of local income that does not need specific 
prior authorization by central government. However, it is subject to a number of 
restrictions.  
 
This has been a long-standing tradition in Belgium. As a result of regionalization, some 
of the restrictions have been altered and the way in which this was the case differed 
between Flanders and Wallonia (Brussels has largely kept the existing framework). 
Ultimately, these alternations are not substantial enough to affect the score on the index. 
We start with the elements that have pertained over time and areas after which some more 
specific regional changes are discussed (Bafoil & Lefèvre, 2008; Dessoy, Erauw & 
Lafontaine, 2014).  
 
Municipalities are free to borrow without needing higher levels of government giving 
them permission in advance: they thus have the a priori autonomy to attract loans for 
financing their activities28.  
 
Confining the scope to which the latter applies is a first restriction. Recourse to borrowing 
should be used to cover extraordinary expenditure such as investment or becoming a 
stakeholder in certain public companies or associations. This could be considered as a 
form of golden rule: ordinary expenditure should be financed by recurrent income. 
Municipalities should not borrow to cover prospective budget or current account deficits 
for ordinary services or provisions.   
 
In the past, municipal financial assets had to be invested with national public credit 
institutions (there even was a special semi-public bank predominantly concerned with 
providing credit for local government). Nowadays, municipalities are free to choose their 
financial partner. However, they are accustomed to turn to one of the major banks active 
on the Belgian market. Given that municipalities are responsible for more than half of all 
investment expenditures in the public sector, there is extensive competition between these 
banks to attract them as clients (leading to low interests, although the financial crisis and 
the subsequent increase in banking regulation has made cheap borrowing less evident).  
 
Since the late 1980s Belgian municipalities are obliged to submit a balanced budget. This 
has implied an implicit cap on individual borrowing (particularly given the investment-
related nature of loans and the practice of a golden rule)29.  
 
In the Flemish region, recently a number of financial rules have changed impinging 
(indirectly) upon borrowing. Budgeting has become part of strategic multi-annual 
planning. Municipalities have to make up such a plan at the beginning of the legislature. 
The plan explicitly has to integrate policy goals with financial and personnel 
 
28 The deterioration of finances in some municipalities has made it necessary in the past to set up emergence 
loans. Here, supervisory authorities can take over financial charges or at least provide a guarantee. Local 
authorities are then obliged to respect a strict financial management plan.  
29 This financial balance is subject to the regime of general supervision (see administrative supervision).  
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE 




commitments. This is part of a policy and management cycle (PMC) used as a 
comprehensive instrument for planning (preparing and budgeting), execution and control 
(oversight and evaluation). This has some specific (mainly indirect) consequences for the 
practice of borrowing. First, a new definition is used for balanced finances. On the one 
hand, there has to be an annual balance in the budget (reconfirming previous regulation). 
On the other hand, an additional structural balance is needed in the long term. Therefore, 
municipalities have to demonstrate their financial base expressed in a positive auto-
finance margin at the end of their planning period. The calculation of this margin takes 
existing loans into account30. The margin indicates that municipalities are capable to carry 
their present burden and have (at least partial) room for new (investment) expenditure 
without needing additional financing through borrowing. Second, in the PMC borrowing 
is no longer explicitly restricted to investment projects. A wider approach is possible in 
which loans can be used to cover broader treasury needs. The idea of specific purpose 
borrowing has thus been left but is compensated by the double balance municipalities 
have achieve.     
 
Also in the Walloon region, regional regulation concerned with municipal budgets stress 
the importance of stabilizing the debt burden to avoid sudden financial deterioration. A 
specific regional agency is designated to help municipalities in financial trouble (and 
ultimately take over financial responsibility). 
 
9 Local authorities' right to associate 
 
As we have stated in the discussion of the scope of local self-government, the Belgian 
rationale of political localism is underpinned by a strong degree of access of the local 
level to central government. Next to the extensive personnel links between both 
government levels through party-political contacts and dual-office holding, the 
assocations of local government play an important role in this regard. The three regional 
associations of local government were formally established in 1977 and originate from 
the federal umbrella (the Association of Belgian Cities and Communes) dating back to 
1913. They represent the municipalities, PCSWs, police zones and some intermunicipal 
companies on their territory. The national umbrella still exists as a platform for 
information exchange and deliberation between the three regional entities, as well as a 
representative of Belgian cities and communes in international and European fora. In fact, 
the different Belgian local government associations are also member of the international 
and European umbrella of local government (i.e. UCLG – United Cities and Local 
Governments; and CEMR – Council of European Municipalities and Regions). As noted 
above, it is above all in Flanders that the association plays a systematic and proactive role 
in policy-making at the central level.  
 
 
30 It is calculated as the difference between the ordinary (exploitation) income and expenditure (without 
interests). From that amount, existing loan burdens (both capital as well as interest amortization) are subtracted. 
The result has to be 0 or more at the end of the planning period.  
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Furthermore, Belgian local government is characterized by a strong degree of inter-
municipal cooperation in different forms across policy domains (e.g. land use, planning, 
utilities such as water, gas and elektricity, finance, medical services, etc.). Much in line 
with the New Public Management discourse, this system is set to provide local services 
more efficiently on a larger scale and to engender public investments in key areas of 
public life. The legal basis of this system of inter-municipal cooperation was a Belgian 
act issued in 1986. This act regulated the legal statute and organisational set-up of the 
institutionalized cooperation between local authorities, as well as (non-institutionalized) 
contracts between local authorities. After the regionalization of local government, the 
three Belgian regions continued to provide a legal framework for the cooperation between 
local governments31.  
 
10 Legal protection of local self -government 
 
Our assessment of the legal protection of local self-government in Belgium is motivated 
by the existence of both constitutional as well as other legal means to assert local 
autonomy (De Becker, 2013). As explained above (see 'constitution and legal foundation 
for local self-government') the constitution provides and protects local self-government. 
In addition and given their legal personality, municipalities can make an appeal to the 
various components of the judicial system which could include matters of central-local 
relations. The most obvious would be the Council of State where recourse can be sought 
against allegedly irregular administrative acts (the Council can suspend or annul the latter 
when assessed as contradicting the legal rules in force). In theory, municipalities can also 
turn to the Constitutional Court (suspending or annulling federal or regional laws found 
contradicting the constitution) or other civic courts (but this is less common and will only 
seldom relate to issues of autonomy). The College of Mayor and Aldermen (the collegiate 
executive) legally represents the municipality in the different courts.  
 
Just like the principle of local self-government should be seen against its negative 
definition and the practice of decentralization and deconcentration, the potential reach of 
judicial appeal should be weighed against the principles and the practices of 
administrative supervision (see 'administrative supervision of local authorities' activities') 
which give central government extensive leeway to limit local autonomy (especially since 
it also includes the expediency of local decisions). 
 
11 Future challenges of the implementation of the European Charter of Local 
Self-Government in Belgian legislation 
 
There are several challenges that the local authorities will have to deal with in the coming 
years. We do not intend to be exhaustive, but we list the most important challenges 
 
31 The Brussels region retained the federal act and complemented this with ordinances regulating the 
administrative supervision and the acknowledgement of the cooperation agreement between the three regions 
regulating cross-regional inter-municipal cooperation. In the Walloon and Flanders region the inter-municipal 
cooperation is regulated in the general local government act.  
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pertinent to local self-government here below (see De Ceuninck, Steyvers & Valcke, 
2016; De Ceuninck, Valcke & Verhelst, 2018). 
 
Firstly, we assume that the scale debate, especially in Flanders, will also determine the 
local political agenda in the coming years. In Flanders, the encouragement of voluntary 
mergers has created a dynamic that is unlikely to stop after 2019, at the start of the next 
local administrative period. In any case, the current regional government further 
stimulates the voluntary merger of muncipalities. At the federal level, there is also the 
scale debate concerning the police zones. The federal government is aiming for an 
enlargement of the current ones in the medium term. 
 
A second challenge, specifically for Flanders, will be to streamline the social policy in 
the Flemish municipalities after the PCSW and the municipality are united. The municipal 
councils are responsible for the social policy within their municipality from 2019, where 
this was formerly assigned to a separate board. This will require a different reflex from 
those municipal councils, and by extension everyone who takes responsibility within a 
local authority.  
 
A third point of attention remains the functioning of the municipal councils, which 
occasionally raises questions. Especially the council’s scrutiny role is questioned more 
and more. This has several causes. For example, the number of municipal tasks has only 
increased over the years together with the complexity of these tasks. This ensures that 
council members have to invest more and more time in their mandate if they want to 
maintain the overview. This is in sharp contrast with the status of council members. The 
vast majority of municipal councillors in Flanders exercise their mandate part-time. 
Because of the limited remuneration council members receive for their work, it is 
impossible for them to carry out their work as a full-time job. This has also to be seen in 
the light of the evolution that the local executive has gone through in recent years. The 
colleges of mayor and aldermen have only become stronger (and often impinge upon the 
traditional policy determination role of the council often reducing the latter to mere policy 
affirmation or rejection). That makes it in no way easier to fill in the controlling role 
councillors have in a serious way. In Flanders, there were some instruments created in 
order to remedy that situation (own president for the council, a commission to overlook 
the inter-municipal partnerships and a 'structural non-management' procedure), but the 
question remains whether that is enough. In any case, a strong tendency of party 
governance is also likely to sustain. With partisan affiliations and interests as a first point 
of reference, the decisional fault lines in the municipalities continue to run along the 
majority versus opposition divide, rather than opposing the executive to the legislative. 
Notwithstanding the potential of preceding discussion behind the closed doors of the party 
group, the functioning of the council in public is often driven by the logic of party 
discipline.     
 
A fourth and final challenge that we put forward here is the debate on how to will deal 
with inter-municipal cooperation in the future. In all three the Belgian regions, there have 
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been scandals in recent years about the internal working of inter-municipal structures. 
These have made it particularly clear that they must be more transparent and that the 
exchange of information between the local and the supra-local government level has to 
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